By Ron Raskin.
The entire world is now discussing the possible collapse of the Ayatollah regime. No one knows what will happen in the coming days—or even hours. Yet one conclusion is already hard to escape: a popular uprising alone may not be enough to bring the regime down, but it will almost certainly mark the end of Khomeinism as an ideology, one way or another.
The core idea behind Khomeinism was simple: seize control of the state through revolution, then use state power to Islamize society from the top down. Decades later, the results are undeniable. This model has failed across every dimension—military, economic, demographic, and ideological. It no longer inspires, mobilizes, or delivers.
Change is coming. The only real question is what form it will take. One option is the total collapse of the regime. The more likely scenario, however, is reform under pressure and partial alignment with Trump’s demands. As seen in Venezuela, Trump appears to have learned from cases such as Iraq that forcibly removing regimes often leads to chaos and anarchy. Instead, sustained pressure aimed at reform and modernization may seem the safer path.
But Iran is not Venezuela!
To understand what may come next, we need to look at the broader ideological landscape. Today, there are three main Islamist ideologies.
The first is Khomeinism —a Shiite ideology focused on Islamizing society from the top down through state control.
The second is Salafism, a Sunni ideology that emerged in the 18th century. It is rigid, literal, and violent. Groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and—yes—Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham originally belong to this camp.
The third is the Muslim Brotherhood, also a Sunni ideology, developed in the early 20th century. It is far more sophisticated than the other two. Its strategy is bottom-up Islamization through social, cultural, and political change. While it does not reject violence, it tends to use it more selectively and cautiously. Hamas, Turkey, and Qatar all operate within this ideological framework.
Given the failure of Khomeinism —and Iran’s already close ties with Muslim Brotherhood actors such as Hamas and Turkey—it is reasonable to assume that Iran may eventually drift toward a similar model. This would mean a shift from ideological rigidity to pragmatism, and possibly the formation of a broader Shiite–Sunni axis centered around cooperation with Turkey.
If the goal is truly to see Iran move in a better direction, one lesson must not be forgotten: what does not kill you makes you stronger. The West must not allow the Ayatollah regime to survive, regroup, and reinvent itself. This is not Venezuela. The Ayatollah regime must be fully removed—not rebranded.