The Asymmetric Nature of Middle East Conflict

By Ron Raskin

The century-long Arab-Israeli conflict—which now extends beyond Arab nations to include non-Arab Muslim countries like Iran and has effectively merged with the Jihad movement—has undergone several phases. The period of large-scale conventional interstate wars ended in 1973, followed by a phase of terrorism that peaked with the second intifada from 2000 to 2005. After failing to secure victory through conventional warfare or terror attacks, Arab nations shifted their strategy, leading the conflict to evolve into a multidimensional struggle and enter a new phase: asymmetric conflict.

In asymmetric conflict, Iran-backed proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas blend military forces with civilian populations. These proxies target Israeli military or civilian sites with the clear intent of provoking an Israeli response, which is likely to result in civilian casualties. These casualties, along with economic damage, are then exploited through propaganda to boost overall motivation within the proxy nations.

In this framework, the loss of lives during active war cycles is significant enough to fuel hatred and motivation, yet not so large as to diminish fighting capabilities. Civilian casualties and economic destruction become desired outcomes of these war cycles, rather than disasters to be avoided. In this context, “victory” is redefined: the objective is no longer military dominance or control over territory and population, but rather control over the informational space and the motivation of the population.

As a result, Iran’s proxies seem “invincible”: “whatever doesn’t kill us makes us stronger.” Consequently, the concept of military deterrence becomes ineffective.

Gaza serves as a testing ground for this approach. Hamas’s continued dominance over Gaza’s population would demonstrate the success of this approach, while successful “deradicalization” would indicate its failure.

The essence of this asymmetric conflict lies in the moral dilemma faced by Western countries: total victory is achievable, but it would come at the cost of significant civilian casualties on the enemy’s side. This raises a critical question: if a society that values human life causes massive loss of life to others, it risks undermining its own moral foundation and potentially destroying itself from within. On the other hand, it’s equally impossible to live under constant attacks and a growing military threat that could lead to eventual destruction through sustained military pressure.

This dilemma poses a major challenge for all Western countries, and especially for Israel. Like any major challenge, it demands new and innovative approaches. The primary goal of these approaches should be to diminish the motivation and willingness of Iran’s proxies to fight. This requires moving beyond the idea of “total victory” and redefining what victory means, along with updating military theory to address the complexities of the 21st century.

As the battlefield between Israel and Iran’s proxies becomes more complex and multidimensional, managing it becomes more challenging. These dimensions include information warfare, legal battles, traditional territorial conflicts, and demographic struggles. Iran’s proxies skilfully use many of these tactics, with notable examples in information and legal warfare.

Israel and other Western countries are both obligated and capable of finding effective responses to each of these dimensions. This will require fundamental changes in various Western systems, such as freedom of speech, which must be adapted but must remain free. Additionally, addressing demographic pressure is crucial, with a focus on prioritizing fertility in Western societies, necessitating a shift in current values.

At present, it appears that many Western countries recognize the challenge. However, they still lack the necessary plans and tools to address it effectively. Developing these plans and tools will require significant resource allocation, but it is both possible and essential.

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