by Ron Raskin
Democracy is the rule of the majority that respects minority rights. We’re all familiar with this expression, but what does it really mean? Does it mean that the majority cannot decide? That sounds like a complete contradiction to the essence of democracy. On the other hand, how can we ensure minority rights if the majority can make any decision it wants?
To resolve this contradiction, try recalling your math lessons from school. Why is that useful? Because if we define democracy as the rule of the majority according to a “weighted average,” we can easily solve the paradox. What does that mean? It means that it’s not enough to simply count votes; we must also consider the intensity of the voters’ commitment—or in other words, how important their choice is to them and how strongly they are willing to fight for it.
For example, if a group makes up only a third of the population but feels very strongly about an issue, their decision could carry the same weight as the two-thirds majority who voted for another option but don’t really care much about the outcome.
Thus, when every voter has the same intensity and gives equal weight to their decision, the majority indeed rules. But when the majority is uncertain or indifferent, the minority effectively “wins,” at least in those cases where their rights are central to the decision.
Of course, anyone reading this post should immediately ask: how do we actually measure the weight of decisions? In practice, it’s not really possible! That’s true. In the case of a direct vote, it’s not really feasible, so the only option is to protect minority rights with a large majority—that is, by having far more than 50% support.
However, this approach has significant practical value in indirect voting systems, such as in confederate or federal countries—which are not uncommon. For example, the United States. An even more interesting example is the European Union. Today, EU activity is partially limited by the need for consensus among all member states to avoid harming any of them. Achieving such broad consensus is challenging, and as the union grows, the problem increases.
But in hierarchical voting systems, where each vote represents a group rather than an individual, quantifying the importance of the decision to each group is not that complicated. Simply conduct an internal vote within the group to see whether the group is neutral or strongly committed. This reflects the issue’s significance to that country.
For example, if a certain country votes 51% in favor versus 49% against a decision, its weight at the union level should probably be less than that of a country where 80% oppose the decision. Of course, one can model an exact formula: if a country opposing the decision at the EU level is internally divided over it, the EU-level decision may pass. But if that opposing country is very determined in its opposition, the decision may fail at the union level. Note that internal voting doesn’t necessarily mean the entire public votes—it could be the country’s parliament representing its citizens.
Thus, framing democracy as the choice of the “weighted average vote” can greatly contribute to building governance mechanisms that are efficient, proportional, and considerate, especially in countries composed of multiple nations.
On my opinion your math is very problematic. For example, there is a strong religious group/country, and the people in that country want religious state. You understand that the most of the people in the whole Union want not that. So, it will be more and more deviations in the decision-making and votings. So, the “weight” of voting will not solve that, course the VALUES are so changed for those group/country that no “good” solution can be made as compromise between the group.
And that is exactly what is happening in the world, both in some unions, and in some countries. So, the formula is not a solution, but the thinking of some compromises is still good. Keep going!
Like any theory, it should be able to explain and model something. In this case: what minority rights actually mean under majority rule. When and how such a theoretical model should be implemented is a separate question. I believe it could be useful in confederations (where nations in a confederation should share a sufficiently strong common denominator to justify being together in the first place) —mainly as a tool to block change rather than to impose it. It could also be applied within a single nation by linking the question to the party people vote for in elections.
I think it’s definitely something worth considering, even in a polarized nation where small groups hold very different values. If the majority is truly determined to push its direction, then decisions will ultimately come down to a simple majority. But if not, this approach may be the right path. Today, religious groups in Israel are minorities; tomorrow, they might become the majority, the roles could reverse but minorities will still be protected.
But again, it’s just a tool, and the decision of whether to use it or not should be made carefully.